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JACK VOLTAIC 3.0

Cyber Research Repor t

Prepare | Prevent | Respond

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Increasingly Connected, Ready to Respond
The Jack Voltaic 3.0 Cyber Research Project is an innovative, bottom-up approach to critical

The Jack Voltaic (JV) Cyber Research Project is an innovative, bottom-up approach to
critical infrastructure resilience that informs our understanding of existing cybersecurity
as well as identify gaps. Jack Voltaic 3.0 will contribute to a repeatable framework cities and
capabilities and identifies gaps. JV 3.0 contributed to a repeatable framework cities and
municipalities nationwide can use to prepare. The research will also provide findings and
municipalities Nationwide can use to prepare. This report on JV 3.0 provides findings and
recommendations for the military, federal agencies, and policy makers.
recommendations for the military, federal agencies, and policy makers.

infrastructure resilience. It will build our understanding of existing cybersecurity capabilities

1 JACK VOLTAIC 3.0

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The Army Cyber Institute’s (ACI’s) Jack Voltaic (JV) project enables the institute to study incident
response gaps alongside assembled partners to identify interdependencies among critical infrastructure
and provide recommendations. JV provides an innovative, bottom‐up approach to critical infrastructure
resilience in two unique ways. Whereas most federal efforts to improve resiliency focus on regional or
multistate emergency response, JV focuses on cities and municipalities where critical infrastructure
and populations are most heavily populated. Furthermore, JV deviates from other cybersecurity and
national preparedness exercises in that it builds around areas of interest nominated by the participants.
Although JV events include national-level capabilities and resources, they are conceptually driven by
the concerns of the cities and their infrastructure partners. Through this approach, the ACI, the Army,
and the Department of Defense (DoD) are able to harvest insights about potential roles, dependencies,
partners, and support requests, while cities are able to discover potential capability gaps and expand
their critical infrastructure information-sharing networks before a potential disaster strikes.
JV 3.0 leveraged the JV approach to allow the ACI to gain insight into how multiple levels of industry
and government respond to a cyberattack against commercial critical infrastructure that supports Army
force projection operations—specifically, critical infrastructure in port cities from which Army personnel
and equipment would deploy in the case of a military conflict overseas.1 In parallel with the Army’s
Defender 20202 force projection exercise, JV 3.0 examined and analyzed the ability of Charleston,
South Carolina (SC), and Savannah, Georgia (GA)—two major ports on the East Coast—to support force
projection in the face of a cyberattack against their commercial critical infrastructure.

CHARLESTON

SAVANNAH
Figure 1: JV 3.0 examined and analyzed the ability of Charleston, SC, and Savannah, GA, to
support force projection in the face of a cyberattack against their critical infrastructure.
1
2

Mark Pomerleau, “How the Army Is Strengthening Cyber Cities,” Fifth Domain, July 30, 2019, https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/
army/2019/07/30/how-the-army-is-strengthening-cyber-cities/.
“DEFENDER-EUROPE 20,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (website), n.d., https://shape.nato.int/defender-europe,
accessed December 29, 2020.
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Originally planned as a 3-day event in April 2020 to be held simultaneously in these two port cities, the
ACI decided to make JV 3.0 two single-day, virtual events—one for Charleston on September 22, 2020,
and one for Savannah on September 24, 2020—because of complications arising from the coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Leveraging the Distributed Environment for Critical Infrastructure
Decision-making Exercise (DECIDE ) platform and Microsoft Teams, the ACI and its partners prepared
the participants for the transition to distributed execution through several virtual tabletop exercises
(TTXs) and rehearsals that included Jack Pandemus, a half-day event that simulated a cyberattack
during pandemic conditions. Table 1 provides information on the different organizations and sectors
that participated in and supported JV 3.0.

®

Sector

Charleston

Savannah

Additional Participants:

Transportation

SC Port Authority

GA Port Authority

GA NG, SC NG, FEMA
Region IV, 3ID, USAG
Fort Stewart, DOE,
ARCYBER, ARNORTH,
Blank Slate Solution,
DCO Region IV, FBI, City
of Hinesville, Chubb
Insurance, M.C. Dean,
Nevada Cyber Solutions,
SoCal Gas, Atlas
Cybersecurity

Southeastern Freight Lines (trucking company)
US Coast Guard
841st Transportation BN (597th TRANS BDE, SDDC)

Energy

Emergency
Management

Charleston Traffic &
Transportation

Savannah Airport
Commission

Dominion Energy

Georgia Power / Southern
Co.

Dominion Energy Gas

BP

SLED

GEMA

City of Charleston EM

Chatham County EM

City of Charleston FD

Chatham County PD / 911

Town of Mount Pleasant
EM

City of Savannah EM
City of Savannah PD & FD

Communications

AT&T Local Solutions
AT&T Public Sector Solutions (FirstNet)

Information
Technology

City of Charleston IT

Chatham County ICS

Town of Mount Pleasant IT

City of Savannah IT

DHS CISA Region IV
Government
Facilities
Water /
Wastewater

City of Charleston

City of Savannah

Charleston County School
District

Chatham County School
District
City of Savannah Water

White Cell and Research
Support:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Table 1: JV 3.0 Participants

Blank Slate Solution
The Citadel
DISA
FTI Consulting
Idaho National
Laboratory
Intrepid Networks
JHU APL
NUARI
Savannah Technical
College
SLED
3ID
University of
Illinois CIRI
University of South
Carolina
U.S. Army War College
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ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF JACK VOLTAIC

The ACI is an outward-facing partnership think tank of the U.S. Army located in West Point, New
York. It began the JV research series to enable the Army’s ability to leverage strategic partnerships, to
improve information sharing and response at all levels of government, and to develop a repeatable
and adaptable framework that local governments can use to rehearse their cyber incident response
capabilities. The idea for JV originated from a workshop conducted by the ACI in April 2016 known as
the Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop.3
Jack Voltaic 1.0—New York City: The inaugural event, JV 1.0, which was developed with industry
partner CITI, examined interdependencies among six critical infrastructure sectors in New York City.
The ACI examined these interdependencies by assessing the performance of federal, state, and local
governments, as well as private industry, in the event of a Cyber Worst Day scenario.4
Jack Voltaic 2.0—Houston: Conducted in August 2018 and developed with industry partner AECOM,
JV 2.0 assembled partners from the City of Houston, the State of Texas, federal agencies, and eight
different sectors to collaborate on an integrated cyber range and TTX. The event centered on a
hypothetical scenario in which a hurricane and cyberspace attack struck simultaneously in and around
the Houston region.
Jack Voltaic 2.5—In summer 2019, the ACI held the JV 2.5 Cyber Workshop Series in the port cities of
San Diego, Tacoma, San Francisco, Savannah, Charleston, Augusta, and Norfolk. The educational series
sought to engage municipality leaders and critical infrastructure sectors to increase cyber awareness
and discuss relationships between commercial critical infrastructure and DoD critical missions. AECOM
and the ACI, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security National Exercise Division,
conducted these 1-day training workshops to share insights from JV 2.0 and discuss how similar efforts
have the potential to strengthen the cyber resiliency of DoD missions.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

JV 3.0 was a city-focused exercise event that demonstrated how multiple small-scale, cascading
cyberattacks against local municipalities and their commercial critical infrastructure in the strategic
port cities of Charleston, SC, and Savannah, GA, could disrupt force projection operations. Research
objectives included the following:
•
•
•
•
•

3
4

Examine the impact of a cyber event on Army force projection;
Exercise the cities of Charleston and Savannah in emergency cyber incident response to ensure the
provision of public services and safeguard critical infrastructure;
Reinforce a whole-of-community approach in response to cyber incidents through sustained, multiechelon partnerships across industry, academia, and government;
Examine the coordination process for providing cyber protection capabilities in support of Defense
Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests; and
Support the development of a repeatable and adaptable framework that allows a city to exercise
its response to a multisector cyber event.

Jonathon Monken et. al, Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop Report (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering
Institute, 2018).
Army Cyber Institute, Jack Voltaic Executive Summary (West Point, NY: Army Cyber Institute, 2016).
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DESIGN CONCEPT

In designing the scenario, the ACI’s strategy was to use injects that progressively built upon one
another, avoid introducing attribution, and keep incident causes ambiguous for as long as possible.
This “death by a thousand cuts” approach allowed the ACI and its partners the opportunity to explore
thresholds at which organizations would identify a cyber incident and request support. Keeping the
cause of the incident ambiguous facilitated debate among participants, encouraged them to share their
decision-making processes with other participants, and increased the realism of the exercise.
The scenario was designed to be played over a series of turns and to weave together multiple
independent threads—a set of sector-specific injects that build on themselves—to form a cohesive
story. Each thread was built such that its specific injects would grow progressively more dangerous,
either by spreading to new areas, organizations, or systems or by causing increased amounts of
damage to affected entities. During the planning workshops leading up to JV 3.0, it was evident that
many participating organizations, particularly in the municipalities, lacked the resources to adequately
defend against a sophisticated adversary. Therefore, the JV Planning Team designed the scenario from
a perspective of assumed compromise. Many of the scenario parameters, such as when malware
exploitation would migrate from sector to sector, were deliberately kept opaque to the players. This
approach forced participants to respond to incidents rather than attempt to defend against them. See
figure 2 for a graphical display of the expected progression.
SCENARIO PHILOSOPHY
• Start small (locality and severity)
• Use injects which build on each other
and in sequence to each other
• Introduce attribution late

SINGLE

SINGLE

CROSS

CROSS

MULTI

MULTI

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

SINGLE

SINGLE

CROSS

CROSS

MULTI

MULTI

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

Catastrophic

SINGLE
Catastrophic

SINGLE

CROSS

High

Catastrophic

SINGLE
SINGLE
Low

Med

CROSS
Med

CROSS
Low

CROSS

MULTI

High

Catastrophic

MULTI

MULTI
High

Med

MULTI
Low

1 Scenario effect causing catastrophic damage
on a singe entity or organization
2 Catastrophic effects cross to another sector
3 Catastrophic effects across multiple entities
or organizations

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

Low

Low

Med

Med

High

High

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

MULTI

Low

Low

Med

Med

High

High

ENTITY
Single: One organization
Cross: Two organizations
Multi: Three or more

DAMAGE
Low: Internally inconvenient or not noticeable, no noticeable external effect
Medium: Internally disruptive, externally inconvenient
High: Internally destructive, externally disruptive
Catastrophic: Serious economic damage and/or some loss of life, serious disruption
or damage to dependent organizations

Figure 2: JV 3.0 Scenario Development Framework
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PLANNING TIME LINE

The ACI and its partners held a series of planning meetings and workshops that facilitated establishing
the membership of the Planning Committee, understanding stakeholder objectives for the exercise,
and developing a scenario that would meet stakeholder and event objectives (see Figure 3, “JV 3.0
Planning Time Line”). Prior to March 2020, the Planning Committee met in person for most meetings
and workshops. These on-site events allowed the members of the committee to develop strong
relationships and trust that eased the transition to virtual events after pandemic-related restrictions
took hold.
When the Planning Committee shifted to a virtual execution, they recognized two key challenges:
maintaining stakeholder engagement and increasing participant comfort with the required technology.
The ACI, Norwich University Applied Research Institute (NUARI), and FTI Consulting sought to address
these challenges by providing stakeholders and participants an opportunity to participate in three
separate virtual TTXs. The first, Jack Pandemus, was a 3-hour event that served as a test for virtual
execution using both NUARI’s DECIDE and Microsoft Teams. Following Jack Pandemus, the ACI and
its partners held two additional 4-hour events using DECIDE and Microsoft Teams. These rehearsal
events allowed the Planning Committee to refine its execution plan and provided participants
additional opportunities to gain experience with the event and the various supporting platforms.

®

®

JV 2.5 workshop in
Charleston, conducted by
the ACI and AECOM and
hosted by the Citadel.

JAN
19

FEB
19

JV 3.0 Legal/Policy TTX
at the Savannah Civic
Center to clarify roles
and relationships in
cyber incident response;
Workshop #2 focused on
refining the scenario.

FEB
20

JAN
20

MAR
19

APR
19

The ACI held the Workshop
Kick-Off Webinar, detailing
the planning teams and
workshop schedule.

DEC
19

NOV
19

The ACI and FTI
Consulting held
Planner Workshop
#1 at the Savannah
Civic Center.
COVID-19 resulted in DoD travel restrictions,
which delayed JV execution from April 2020 to
September 2020 and prompted the ACI to change
JV 3.0 from an on-site event to a virtual event.

MAR
20

APR
20

MAY
20

The ACI, FTI Consulting, and NUARI
held Planner Workshop #3 in
Charleston, SC, to validate the scenario
and execution with stakeholders.

MAY
19

The ACI and FTI Consulting
conducted site surveys with
stakeholders in Savannah,
GA, to refine stakeholder
objectives and identify
additional participants.

OCT
19

The ACI, FTI Consulting,
and NUARI executed Jack
Pandemus, a distributed
TTX that focused on
Charleston and Savannah’s
responses to a cyberattack
during a pandemic.

JUN
20

JUN
19

JUL
20

SEP
19

IPM with city, state, and
federal representatives
at the Georgia
Cyber Center to gain
concurrence on scope
and event objectives.

JUL
19
MPM with city,
state, and federal
representatives in
Savannah, GA, to
determine initial
stakeholder
objectives for
JV 3.0.

AUG
19

The ACI and FTI Consulting
conducted site surveys with
stakeholders in Savannah, GA, to
refine stakeholder objectives and
identify additional participants.
Rehearsals for distributed
execution, focusing on
participant familiarization
and data collection.

AUG
20

Virtual workshops
with the cities of
Charleston and
Savannah focused on
transitioning from
an on-site event to a
virtual one.

Figure 3: JV 3.0 Planning Time Line

SEP
20
Execution
of JV 3.0
as a virtual,
distributed
event.
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EVENT FORMAT

During each single-day event, participants played the scenario over a series of turns, each of which
included three phases. Phase 1, “Assess,” allocated approximately 10 minutes for participants to
go through their messages in the DECIDE platform. Within those messages were sector-specific
injects as well as messages from other participants (if they had sent any) requesting or supplying
information. Phase 2, “Discuss,” lasted approximately 15 minutes. In this phase, participants
discussed the injects with the other members of their breakout groups. Lastly, Phase 3, “Integrate,”
lasted approximately 45 minutes and brought all of the breakout groups back into an open forum
in which they shared their internal discussions and determined how they would respond to the
information provided.

®

Figure 4: Turn Phases

® platform to record observations based on their

During each phase, data collectors used the DECIDE
assigned areas.
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS
1. Examine the Impact of a Cyber Event on Army Force Projection
a. The Army relies on various interdependent critical infrastructures, the majority of which it does
not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily reliant on external resources.
b. A sophisticated adversary can disrupt force deployment and cause units to miss the Required
Delivery Date by: (1) targeting commercially owned critical infrastructure and local municipal
sectors; or (2) using cyber capabilities that do not trigger an armed response but still achieve
cascading effects that complicate a coordinated response.
c. Interactions and interdependencies between communications and information technology
systems present new gray-zone attack vectors that can have debilitating impacts on Maritime
Transportation System operations vital to force projection.
d. The current multidomain environment becomes contested for deploying units as early as the
fort, thereby presenting the potential for degraded freedom of maneuver when conducting
home-station movement operations. Therefore, military deployment operations can no longer
assume such favorable conditions and must plan and prepare for and be ready to mitigate such
physical and cyber disruptions accordingly.
2. Exercise the Cities of Charleston and Savannah in Cyber Incident Response
a. There is no standard for cyber incident declaration. Cyber incident declaration was found to
be insufficient in addressing activities that are rated as below catastrophic and are likely not as
obvious, yet are still operationally impactful for all parties.
b. There is an emerging need for city-level information security departments to address potential
cross-system issues between organic and isolated networks, such as supervisory control and
data acquisition and traffic management systems.
c. Participants across sectors and levels of government noted that the realistic scenario incidents
stressed the participants’ procedures and forced them to think differently.
d. Participants across sectors and different levels of government should use municipality-focused
cyber exercises to improve overall incident response.
e. Municipality-focused cyber and emergency management exercises can be effectively executed
in a distributed format that supports continuous participant engagement across both public and
private sector stakeholders.
3. Reinforce a Whole-of-Community Approach
a. Although traditional incident responses—such as for natural disasters or chemical or biological
threats—are generally effective and coordinated, there is a need for improving responses to
purposeful cyberattacks.
b. JV 3.0 addressed the need of many participating agencies affiliated with the cities for fully
formed response plans and communication networks.
c. JV 3.0 revealed the need for more regular and codified cross-sector communication and
collaboration efforts during cyber incident response.
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d. JV 3.0 and the JV series continue to facilitate lasting relationships between a vast array of
participating organizations, entities, and sectors.
e. JV 3.0 successfully brought together a wide array of public, private, military, and academic
stakeholders during event planning, preparation, and execution for the first time. However, the
consensus remains that these new relationships must be continually fostered, and additional
stakeholders (those who did not participate in this iteration of JV) must be both identified and
incorporated going forward through future, organically driven, JV-like efforts.
4. Examine the Coordination Process for Providing Cyber Protection Capabilities in Support of DSCA
a. Though Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR) has been codified in policy, it has
not yet been exercised, and it is unclear how it would work during an incident.
b. DSCIR should provide a menu of options and their associated costs similar to DSCA’s menu of
physical assets.
c. Whether DSCA or DSCIR is the appropriate mechanism for receiving support in the event of a
cyber incident that is beyond the ability of local resources to handle, each municipality needs a
clear chain of requests, which could include federal or military resources.
d. The mechanisms and request chain for the military to request support from their surrounding
community (“reverse DSCIR”) need to be explored.
5. Support the Development of an Adaptable and Repeatable Framework
a. Every municipality is different, so it is difficult to develop a “one size fits all” framework.
b. The Law and Policy TTX is an integral part of the framework requirements due to the challenge
of translating national-level laws and policies at the local level and differences in laws and
policies across states and localities.
c. Municipalities do not have the dedicated staff to develop these events internally and will need
low- to no-cost assistance to do so.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Municipalities should consider adopting new internal incident command structures that enable
the formation of tailored whole-of-community efforts consisting of synchronized communication,
information sharing, and resource allocation during cyber and emergency incident response.
2. Establish a mentorship program between municipalities that encourages information sharing and
joint cybersecurity exercises. The partnership program provides a safe learning environment in
which local organizations can further develop their working relationships.
3. Federal, state, and local leaders must recognize cybersecurity and cyber incident response as a key
responsibility and allocate resources to personnel, training, and education shortfalls accordingly.
4. State cyber and emergency incident response entities, such as the SC Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity program within the SC Law Enforcement Division and the Georgia Emergency
Management and Homeland Security Agency, should work to establish standing, mutually
supportive cyber resource support agreements that utiltize the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact framework and Mission Ready Packages to build regionally focused cyber incident
response and support plans for responding to a cascading cyber incident.5
5. Federal and state entities should execute annual law and policy TTXs that extend to municipalities
and private industry. These events provide a venue in which leaders and responders can identify
gaps in authorities, rehearse resource requests, and identify potential thresholds. In particular,
State and National Guard response authorities and mechanisms differ by state and locality, and
these will continue to evolve as cyberspace is better understood. As such, the law and policy TTXs
will be critical for understanding the roles and responsibilities associated with utilizing National
Guard resources.
6. Federal and state agencies should design and establish a data repository for resources and data
related to cyber incidents, tailored responses, impacts, and exercises to facilitate the sharing of
policies, procedures, best practices, data, and emerging issues. The repository should be open for
municipalities and private entities to deposit and utilize resources to increase the resilience of their
associated critical infrastructure.
7. The Department of Homeland Security, in concert with the DoD, should examine and potentially
expand the United States Coast Guard Cyber Command’s authorizations, resources, and mission set
to include initial cyber incident response support for strategic ports and port cities.
8. Through the respective garrisons, U.S. Army Installation Management Command should work to
develop, incorporate, resource, and exercise a tailored cyber incident response annex within its
emergency incident response plans for force projection and deployment operations.
9. DoD planners must utilize integrated campaigning at multiple echelons (city, county, and state) to
understand adversary actions against interorganizational partners and better inform campaign plan
assumptions.
10. In conjunction with academic and government partners, the ACI should develop and implement
automated tools that will allow novice planners to rapidly design and quickly execute JV-like events.

5

“Emergency Management Assistance Compact,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (website), n.d.,
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACoverviewForNRF.pdf.
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ACRONYMS
Acronym

Definition

3ID

3rd Infantry Division

ACI

Army Cyber Institute

ARCYBER

United States Army Cyber Command

ARNORTH

U.S. Army North

BDE

Brigade

CIRI

Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute

CISA

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

COVID-19

Coronavirus disease 2019

DCO

Defense coordinating officer

DECIDE®

Distributed Environment for Critical Infrastructure Decision-making Exercise

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

DSCA

Defense Support to Civil Authorities

DSCIR

Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response

EM

Emergency management

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FD

Fire department

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

GA

Georgia

GEMA

GA Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency

ICS

Industrial control system

IPM

Initial planning meeting

IT

Information technology

JHU APL

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

JV

Jack Voltaic

MPM

Midplanning meeting

NG

National Guard

NUARI

Norwich University Applied Research Institutes

PD

Police department

SC

South Carolina

SDDC

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

SLED

SC Law Enforcement Division

TRANS

Transportation

TTX

Tabletop exercise

USAG

U.S. Army Garrison

Table 2: Acronyms
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cyber.army.mil
@ArmyCyberInst

@ArmyCyberInstitute

armycyberinstitute

armycyberinstitute

For the full report as well as more information on JV, please visit the JV website at
https://cyber.army.mil/Research/Jack-Voltaic/

